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Matching problems under preferences have been studied widely in mathemat-
ics, computer science and economics, starting with the seminal paper by Gale
and Shapley (1962). A comprehensive survey on this topic was published also
in Chapter 14 of the Handbook of Computational Social Choice (Klaus et al.,
2016), and for the interested reader we recommend consulting the following four
comprehensive books on the computational (Gusfield and Irving, 1989; Manlove,
2013) and game-theoretical, market design aspects (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990;
Roth, 2015) of this topic. In this chapter our goal is to give a general overview of
the related applications.
The theory and practice of mechanism design for matching problems have
always developed in an interactive way. Practical applications have motivated
scientific research and theoretical results have been used for designing new ap-
plications and redesigning old ones. The college admission problem was first
described and resolved by Gale and Shapley (1962). Their definition of stable
matching proved to be the most crucial solution concept for two-sided markets.
Furthermore, their algorithmic solution, the so-called deferred acceptance (DA)
mechanism, has been used in many important applications, such as the cen-
trally coordinated schemes for college admissions in Europe (Hungary, Spain,
Turkey, Ireland, etc.), school choice programmes (in many US cities, Amsterdam,
or Hungary) and for medical resident allocation (US, Japan, UK, etc.). But in
fact, in some applications this matching mechanism has been invented and de-
veloped independently from the theoretical research. This is certainly the case
for the US resident allocation program, NRMP, where the DA algorithm was al-
ready implemented in 1952 (Roth, 1984). Moreover, the special features of these
applications have been constantly creating new theoretical problems. For an il-
lustrative example we briefly describe the issue of couples in resident allocation
problems.
As the proportion of women has increased over time in the medical field, so
has the number of married couples among the residents. Most of these couples
decided not to participate in the US centralised clearinghouse in the 1970s and
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1980s, because they were afraid to get allocated to places far away from each
other, which could ruin their partnership during the two-year internship period.
So they were looking for pairs of positions outside of NRMP, which started to un-
dermine the efficiency of the mechanism. Therefore in the 1980s the coordinators
allowed the couples to submit joint applications within the programme. However,
they treated these applications in a special way, asking the couples to nominate
a leading person from the couple and only after allocating him/her they tried to
find a place for the spouse. This was not satisfactory for the couples, and they
kept staying out of the clearinghouse.
The scientific community working in this field took notice of this issue and
started to investigate it. First, game theorists showed that if we were to allow
the couples to submit joint preferences, which seemed to be inevitable, the ex-
istence of a stable matching is not guaranteed anymore (Roth, 1984). Later, the
computer science community provided the further bad news that checking the
existence of a stable solution is NP-complete (Ronn, 1990). Yet, the coordina-
tors of NRMP decided to allow the couples to submit arbitrary joint preferences
and asked two experts to redesign the matching mechanism. Roth and Peranson
took an engineering approach and have succeeded to construct a new heuristic
mechanism, based on the DA, that could deal with the issue of couples in the
NRMP (Roth and Peranson, 1999). This algorithm has been used in many similar
applications since (Roth, 2008). In the last two decades both economists and
computer scientists have investigated the possible reasons for the tractability of
this special feature in real applications, a survey on which was written by Biró
and Klijn (2013).
In this chapter we try to give a comprehensive description on the important ap-
plications of matching models under preferences without monetary transfers. We
focus on applications where central coordination has already been established,
but we also mention applications which are not (yet) centrally coordinated, since
central coordination can emerge in the future and matching models can also be
useful to analyse the decentralised matching processes. We highlight the most
relevant special features of the applications and we give pointers to the corre-
sponding theoretical literature, related models and solutions concepts.
Personally, I always found it crucial to understand how the applications are
working and what are the main issues to be resolved. Together with colleagues
at University of Glasgow we started to collect descriptions of existing applications
with references, and we continued this project from 2010 in Budapest (Web-
site on matching practices at Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2012). In 2010
the Matching in Practice research network has been established in Europe and
we also started to collect descriptions of college admission, school choice and
early labour allocation practices (Website of the Matching in Practice network,
2014). Finally, in a new COST Action project we are now trying to understand
and describe how kidney exchange programmes are operating in Europe (Web-
site of COST Action: European Network for Collaboration on Kidney Exchange
Programmes, 2016).
There are also examples from outside of Europe for using a scientific approach
to systematically review matching applications and to give policy design advice
on their (re-)design. Al Roth has been leading this initiative with his informative
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blog (Website of Al Roth’s blog, 2010), and his new book (Roth, 2015) by giv-
ing a comprehensive high level overview on market design together with many
real examples. One particularly successful organisation which has emerged also
through the work of Roth and his colleagues is the Institute for Innovation in
Public School Choice (Website of Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice,
2014), which helps to advise US cities on their school choice practices.
The design of practical applications and the scientific research in multiple dis-
ciplines are developing together, and that is what is needed to obtain successful
solutions. On the one hand, these successes validate the theoretical findings and
boost further research in the newly emerging interdisciplinary fields of Compu-
tational Social Choice and Market Design, among others. On the other hand, the
scientific results will ultimately lead to better mechanisms that provide fairness
and optimality in a transparent and efficient way.
In Section 18.2 we start with the description of classical two-sided matching
markets, such as college admission, school choice and resident allocation. We
continue with two-sided markets where only one side has preferences in Section
18.3. In Section 18.4 we describe applications based on exchange models. Fi-
nally, we consider some further models in Section 18.5 and we study the related
applications.
To publish papers in economics or computer science journals, theoretical re-
sults are strongly expected, so one cannot just publish a paper merely by de-
scribing applications. Indeed, most of the scientific papers cited in this chapter
that are motivated by some applications typically focus only on one or two spe-
cial features of the applications. Therefore, it is hard to judge how relevant these
features are and whether there are some further crucial characteristics of the
applications which are not mentioned or studied in the scientific papers refer-
enced. So, whenever my descriptions are entirely based on scientific papers the
reader must be warned that there may be some missing information. However, I
can be more confident in the completeness of my notes when they are based on
a description written by an expert and published, e.g., at the Matching in Prac-
tice website, or when the knowledge is mostly coming from my personal experi-
ence and research. To highlight the latter cases I will use framed environments
whenever I had some personal information on the application.
Finally, we note that there are two closely related chapters in this book. In
Chapter 15, Mattei and Walsh describe Preflib.org, a data library that also in-
cludes some data of matching applications. Cechlárová gives an overview on the
theory and practice of trainee teachers in Slovakia in Chapter 19.
18.2 Two-Sided Markets
Stable matchings in two-sided markets were first studied by Gale and Shapley
(1962) with title "College admissions and the stability of marriage". Their solution
was based on the concept of stability. A matching is stable if there is no pair of
agents who would be mutually better off by forming a new pair, after abandoning
their previous partners. For college admissions the meaning of stability is that
an applicant can only be rejected from a college if the college filled its quota
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with better applicants. This property is easy to check if the rankings by the
colleges are based on scores and the so-called cutoff scores are published, which
can be the scores of the weakest admitted applicants at the saturated colleges.
Such cutoff systems are in use in many European countries, including Hungary,
Ireland, Spain and Turkey.
Gale and Shapley gave an efficient algorithm for computing an applicant-
optimal stable matching with the DA mechanism. This mechanism can be im-
plemented in such a way that its running time is linear in the number of appli-
cations. Moreover, the mechanism is strategy-proof for the students. However,
this mechanism is not Pareto optimal for the students, if we consider the set of
all possible assignments, and not just the stable ones. The Top Trading Cycles
algorithm used for two-sided markets achieves Pareto efficiency, it is strategy-
proof, but fails to ensure stability. Finally, in many applications the so-called
immediate acceptance (IA) or Boston mechanism is used, where the significant
difference compared to DA is that the acceptances are final, so a college does not
consider any new applications after its quota becomes filled. This mechanism is
highly manipulable, and does not provide stable solutions, but for some special
instances it can improve ex ante efficiency compared to DA. Nevertheless this
first choice first priority system was banned in the UK for use in school choice
(Pathak and Sönmez, 2013). See references and further theoretical findings in
Section 1 of the chapter by Klaus et al. (2016).
To the best of our knowledge the first usage of the Gale-Shapley algorithm in a
centralised matching programme was not for college admissions, but for resident
allocation in the US as early as in 1952. Therefore we start our description of
applications with resident allocation programmes and early labour applications
in general.
Early Labour Markets
Allocating graduates to their first positions in a centrally coordinated way is typi-
cal in professions where internships are necessary for learning the practices and
getting the licences. Therefore, most of these centralised intern allocation pro-
grammes have been established in the medical field, but there are also examples
in law studies and army related professions. However, our first, very early ex-
ample will be related to the famous engineering school of France that has been
providing an elite education for the most talented students and a constant re-
source of trained professionals for the French ministries.
Sorting graduates at École polytechnique in 1806. This institution was
founded in 1794, reorganised and named École polytechnique in 1805 under
Napoleon, and it is still in operation. The students have always been selected
by a highly competitive entrance exam, and after graduation they were sorted
to ministries through a coordinated mechanism, called classement sortie. Af-
ter the first three years of a decentralised system (1797-1799) a common final
exam and sorting mechanism was established. Between 1799 and 1806 the
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students were asked to declare one service of their choice targeted at the be-
ginning of their studies, however, the number of openings at the ministries
varied, so many students had to find a different service in an after match pe-
riod from what they had declared. To resolve this issue, the council approved
a new system where the students could declare two choices, but at the end
they modified this to a much simpler mechanism. In the implemented mech-
anism the students were commonly ranked in a master list, and they could
choose their services one by one, without making any declaration beforehand.
Thus, in mechanism design terms, the one-application system was replaced
by a serial dictatorship mechanism based on a common ranking. See more
details in Belhoste (2003).
National Resident Matching Program. The allocation of junior doctors to hos-
pitals in the US used to work in a decentralised way until 1950 with various
problems, as described in Roth (1984). In 1950 the market participants agreed
to establish a central coordination, where the doctors submit their preferences,
the hospitals submit their rankings and an algorithm computes the allocation.
After the trial run in the academic year 1950/51 (which was not used in the
real allocation) some students complained about the fairness of the mechanism,
and so they agreed to adjust the mechanism, which was implemented in 1951
and was first used in 1952. This new algorithm was mathematically equivalent to
the hospital-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm (Roth, 1984; Gale and Sotomayor,
1985). In the early 1990s the trust in the central allocation system started to
erode, party because of the spreading knowledge over the hospital-optimality
(and thus doctor-pessimality and manipulability) of the mechanism and also be-
cause of the unsatisfactory way it treated the couples. Thus, the board of NRMP
decided to redesign the mechanism on a scientific base, led by Roth and Peran-
son, as documented by Roth and Peranson (1999). The new algorithm, approved
in 1997 and first used in 1998, switched to the applicant-proposing variant (al-
though one of the main findings of Roth and Peranson was that the solutions
produced by the two variants were not significantly different, suggesting that in
large markets the set of stable solutions may be small in expectation). They also
constructed a new heuristic algorithm, based on the Roth-Vande Vate process,
to deal with the couples, and also to satisfy some further requirements. The al-
gorithm has remained in operation since, and was subsequently used in many
similar applications run by the National Matching Services Inc. (a private com-
pany based in Canada, founded by Peranson), see the details and the list of three
dozen particular programmes by Roth (2008).
Resident allocation programmes in the UK. In the 1960s the British National
Health Service recognised the issues with their decentralised resident allocation
processes and thus recommended the usage of centralised schemes. However,
the allocations were organised in regions separately, and NHS did not specify
the allocation mechanism to be used, so almost every region adopted a different
method (Roth, 1990, 1991). An interesting feature of the UK schemes was that
350 P. Biró
the doctors had to apply for a pair of positions, a six-month medical and a six-
month surgical post, and they could also indicate their preferences over the order
they wanted to take these positions. Yet, if we assume responsive preferences
for the doctors (i.e., the preference over two surgical positions is not influenced
by the medical position assigned, and vica versa), then stable solutions can be
obtained separately for the two kinds of positions leading to pairwise stable solu-
tions for the many-to-two markets. However, if the allocation of either of the two
positions fails to be stable then the overall solution is also bound to be blocked
by a hospital-doctor pair. Roth has studied the allocation mechanisms of ten
regions, and he found that four of them produced stable solutions and all four of
them remained in use at the time of writing. However, from those six that could
produce unstable solutions only two remained in operation, the other four were
abandoned. Therefore this natural experiment provided strong evidence for the
importance of stability in two-sided markets.
Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme. The Scottish scheme was similar
in characteristic to the above described UK schemes until 2005, when the
programme was named SPA (Scottish PRHO Allocations). The solutions were
computed from 2000 by Rob Irving with a sophisticated algorithm which not
only provided stable solution for both medical and surgical positions sepa-
rately, but also satisfied as many seasonal preferences as possible by a flow
algorithm (Irving, 1998). In 2006 the programme was renamed SFAS (Scot-
tish Foundation Allocation Scheme) and in the new scheme some character-
istics also changed. Instead of the medical and surgical positions the doctors
had to apply for a 2-year Foundation Programme that they conducted at one
hospital. The hospitals’ rankings were not provided independently, but they
were deduced from a common scoring method and these also involved ties.
The primary goal of the mechanism was to return a (weakly) stable matching
of maximum size, which is an NP-hard problem even for master lists (Irving
et al., 2008). The computation had been done by a sophisticated heuristic
(Irving and Manlove, 2009). From 2009 the programme has also allowed the
joint applications of couples, although in a slightly restricted form, so the
matching algorithm had to be redesigned accordingly (Biró et al., 2011). In
2012 the Foundation Programme allocation in Scotland started to be han-
dled by the UK Foundation Office, and unfortunately we have no information
about the exact mechanism that they use.
Japanese Resident Matching Program. A new allocation system was intro-
duced in 2009 to make the distribution of the residents more balanced in Japan
(Kamada and Kojima, 2012). Regional caps have been imposed to reduce the
number of doctors allocated in large cities and increase their numbers in rural
areas. However, the implementation of the regional caps was strongly criticised
from a market design perspective, see, e.g., Kamada and Kojima (2016, 2017), as
the ministry introduced artificial quotas for all the hospitals (summing up to the
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regional quota in each region) which may lead to inefficient solutions with regard
to the hard regional constraints.
Teacher allocation in France. Since 1999 the centralised (re-)allocation
scheme is organised in two-rounds involving newly tenured teachers and also
those teachers who want to change positions. In the first round they allocate the
teachers to regions, and in the second round they do the (re-)allocation within
each region separately. The priorities of the teachers for positions are based
primarily whether they are moving to the region where their spouses are living
and then by seniority. The matching mechanism is a combination of the school-
proposing DA and the stable improvement cycles algorithm by Erdil and Ergin
(2008). See more details by Terrier (2014) and a mechanism design analyses by
Combe et al. (2015).
Allocation of lawyers in Germany. Every year more than 8000 graduating
lawyers are assigned to legal internship positions, organised separately in each
region (Bundesland). At the beginning of the process the set of admitted candi-
dates is determined, where the majority are selected by their First State Exam
grades, but some quotas are preserved for applicants with high waiting times and
also with low social-economic status. The mechanism used in Berlin is conjec-
tured to be the lawyer-oriented DA. A critical analyses of the mechanism is given
by Dimakopoulos and Heller (2015).
Economics job market in the US. This is a partly centralised system, as the
application platform is common and the majority of the interviews take place at
the annual Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meeting, based on which
the employers send out the flyouts. An interesting feature is that each candidate
can send two signals to the employers, which help them to select the twenty
applicants for interview from the hundreds of candidates (Coles et al., 2013). The
final offer-rejection part of the process is decentralised.
Allocation in the US Navy. According to Short (2000), Robards (2001) and
Yang et al. (2003) more than 300,000 personnel are (re-)assigned with the help
of around 300 detailers in every period. Besides the strict eligibility criteria, the
presence of couples is also an important feature recognised. Finally, unlike in the
resident allocation, all the sailors have to be allocated and also some critical Navy
billets must be filled. The latter requirement alone may prevent the existence of
a stable matching.
Assigning positions in humanitarian organisations. Similar problems have
been identified in the internal assignment process of humanitarian organisations
(Soldner, 2014). Here also the goal is to find a complete matching, but instead
of using orders, as in the army, they try to modify the preferences of both the
staff and the job holders by costly negotiations. The problem of finding a com-
plete stable matching for adjusted preferences with minimum negotiation costs
is solved by heuristics and integer programming techniques.
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Finally, note that we moved the description of the resident allocation pro-
gramme of Israel to subsection 18.3, since the usage of a single item allocation
model is more appropriate for that application.
College Admissions
College admission was the motivating application of Gale and Shapley (1962), and
indeed an increasing number of countries have established centrally coordinated
higher education admissions. In this section we describe some European, South
American and Asian applications.
Europe. In many European countries the college admission is organised via a
nationwide scheme involving all kinds of programmes. In Spain, cut-off scores
have been computed by the student-proposing DA with limited preference lists
and university rankings based on the students’ grades and entrance exam scores
according to Romero-Medina (1998). In Turkey, the cutoff score system is sim-
ilar, but the college-proposing DA was used with tie-breaking by the age of the
students, at the time of writing (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999). In Ireland, the
cut-off scores are also published, but the ties are broken by lottery. The stu-
dents can apply to at most 10 programmes and their scores are mainly coming
from the Leaving Certificate Examinations, but the universities have freedom in
choosing their scoring method. In the matching process essentially the college-
proposing DA is applied in a manual form, where the students have to accept
or reject the offers round by round every week. A further speciality is that the
proposal-rejection mechanism is used separately for so-called level 6/7 degree
programmes (2-3 year programmes) and for level 8 programmes (4 year pro-
grammes), so a student might be admitted to two places from which she can
choose one at the end (Chen, 2012).
The French admission system is fragmented: there are several small schemes
for admission to the elite Grandes Écoles, but there is a central clearinghouse,
called Admission Post Bac (APB) (Frys and Staat, 2015). In theory, the univer-
sities participating in APB are not selective, but due to the overdemand they do
select their students and prioritise the students coming from the local region
and the first choice applications are also preferred to second choice applications.
The latter speciality makes the mechanism similar to IA, thus causing strategic
issues. The mechanism is applied in three rounds, and after each round the
students can decide whether a) they accept their offer and withdraw their other
applications, or b) just tentatively accept the offer and wait for a potentially bet-
ter offer, or c) reject the offer and wait for better offer, or d) cancel all of their
applications.
There are some European countries where the universities should provide
open access to education for all students that satisfy the requirements, except in
the use of some special fields of study with limited spaces, such as medicine, den-
tistry, veterinary medicine, and pharmacy. Among these countries, in Belgium
the universities are divided by language. Flemish universities have common en-
trance exams for medicine and dentistry, whilst French-speaking universities
have entrance exams for civil engineering studies (Cantillon and Declercq, 2012).
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In Italy each field of study with caps has the entrance exams on the same day,
so essentially every student can only apply to one university in each field of study
(Merlino and Nicoló, 2013). Germany has also centralised admissions in medical
studies. The first 20% of the seats are allocated to the students with the best
grades, another 20% are allocated to students with long waiting times and the
remaining 60% are according to the universities’ rankings. In the first two groups
the Boston mechanism is used, whilst for the last group the university-proposing
DA is employed (Kübler, 2011). The flaws of this sequential mechanism have
been studied in several scientific papers (Dwenger et al., 2010; Westkamp, 2013;
Braun et al., 2014).
Hungary. In the Hungarian higher education admission scheme around
100,000-150,000 thousand students are allocated to programmes every year.
From 1996 a heuristic based on the university-proposing DA was used, and
in 2007 the student-oriented DA was implemented with some adjustments
to deal with the special features. The students are ranked at most universi-
ties based on their exam scores, although different sets of subjects count for
different programmes. The allocation is announced by publishing the cut-off
scores. One special feature is that the ties are not broken, so students with
equal scores are either all admitted or all rejected, which is a tractable fea-
ture by an extension of the DA (Biró and Kiselgof, 2015). The universities can
also set lower quotas for the number of students admitted for each of their
studies separately, which leads to an NP-hard problem, and thus requires a
heuristic solution (Biró et al., 2010). Most Hungarian students are eligible
for free studies in the majority of the programmes if they are willing to sign a
contract, but it is also possible to attend most of the programmes under a dif-
ferent contract where tuition fee must be paid. These two kinds of contracts
can be listed in the preference list of the students in any order. Another sig-
nificant feature is that the government can set a national common quota in
each field of study on the number of students admitted under state financed
contracts. These common upper quotas together with the faculty quotas (ap-
plied to students under both kinds of contracts) make also the problem of
finding a stable solution NP-hard (Biró et al., 2010). Paired applications are
also allowed for teachers’ programmes, which causes similar difficulties to
the presence of couples in the resident allocation programmes. In a recent
paper we investigated integer programming techniques to deal with the NP-
hard cases, and the feature of lower quotas turned out to be tractable even
for large real instances (Ágoston et al., 2016). New features of the scheme are
the limited length preference lists since 2013, and the possibility of applying
to dual university programmes since 2015, where a university programme is
linked to an industrial internship. However, the admissions for these intern-
ship positions are organised in a decentralised way, causing discrepancies.
Brazil has a college admission system, where affirmative action policies are des-
ignated to secure place for racial minorities, low-income families and students
coming from public highschools. However, the implementation of this policy is
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badly designed, separate quotas are devoted to students claiming each possible
combination of privileges, sometimes leading to higher cut-off scores for students
claiming some privilege than others who do not claim that. This results in un-
fairness, strategic manipulations on what privileges to claim, and unsatisfactory
allocation with regard to the affirmative action goals (Aygün and Bó, 2015). In
Chile the admission scheme is similar to the Hungarian one with respect to the
feature that the ties are not broken, but interestingly their policy is more per-
missive, as they always admit the last group of students with whom the quota is
violated (Ríos et al., 2014).
The largest centrally coordinated college admission system is operating in
China, however the allocation mechanism runs separately with respect to the
students applying from the same province. The universities are partitioned into
tiers according to their prestige, and their rankings over the students are based
on the national standardised test results. Regarding the allocation mechanism,
the so-called sequential mechanism was replaced by the so-called parallel mech-
anism in 27 from the 31 provinces between 2002 and 2012 (Chen and Kesten,
2013). The sequential mechanism is essentially the IA mechanism used in each
tier, whilst in the parallel mechanism the students can submit multiple ordered
lists as choices, and for each of their choices the serial dictatorship is used sep-
arately.
In South Korea the admission system was redesigned in 1994. Until 1994
there were only two admission dates, and a student could only attend the exam
of one university on each date, so essentially there were only two possible ap-
plications. Moreover, the elite universities all scheduled their exam on the first
date. After 1994 the results of the comprehensive exam were published before
the application period, and they also introduced an early admission period, where
the students could apply to one university and they received binding offers ac-
cording to their state exams. In the regular admission period each university
could choose one from the four potential dates to conduct specialised exams. So
the students could apply to four universities, but the elite universities decided
to schedule their exams to one of the first two dates in an interesting pattern
after an adjustment period. The game-theoretic reasons for the behaviour of the
universities have been studied in Avery et al. (2014).
School Choice
Before going into the details of the applications, we note that the model behind
school choice applications is considered to be slightly different from the Gale-
Shapley college admission model. This is because the school seats can be seen
as goods to be allocated, over which the children may have different priorities.
Thus the main difference is that the schools are not necessarily strategic agents.
The stability of a matching in a school choice setting can be therefore interpreted
as the lack of justified envy, i.e. no student should have priority over another
student assigned to a school if the former student is assigned to a less preferred
place (or no place at all). For a comprehensive overview on school choice, we refer
to Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003).
However, we shall note that the usage of this modified model is not appropriate
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for every school choice application. In fact, as we will see in the descriptions, in
Hungary the elementary and secondary schools are strategic players, as they can
rank their applicants in any way they want (Biró, 2012), just like in Estonia (Lauri
et al., 2014). Meanwhile, in almost all of the nationwide university admission sys-
tems that we have seen, the universities must use a commonly defined ranking
method, together perhaps with some special priority structures and constraints
imposed by the governments. So the universities cannot always be considered
strategic players, as already observed in some early scientific papers on college
admissions in Spain (Romero-Medina, 1998) and Turkey (Balinski and Sönmez,
1999). Yet, for university admissions the students are typically ranked by merit,
so they can influence their rankings. This model was called student-placement
problem by Balinski and Sönmez (1999).
To sum up the terminology, the Gale-Shapley college admission model refers
to the case where both sides of the market are strategic. In the school choice
and student placement models only the students are strategic, and the seats are
considered as objects to be allocated. The slight difference between the latter
two models is that in the school choice model we consider the priorities to be ex-
ogenously given, whilst in the student placement model the rankings are (partly)
based on the students’ performances, so the students can influence them.
We can actually give examples for the adequate use of each of the three models
at any level of application, i.e., for school choice, college admissions and resident
allocation. Note that the terminologies of the college admission and school choice
models have probably been established with regard to the US context, but as we
explained, one should use them with caution in other countries.
US city highschools. The decentralised New York school choice system
switched to a centralised programme using the student-proposing DA with dis-
tance and sibling priorities and lotteries in 2004 (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a,
2013), immediately reducing the number of administratively assigned students
from 30,000 to 3,000. The random tie-breaking was criticised, as the lotteries
can create a seemingly artificial stability constraint. It was showed that around
2-3% of the students could have been assigned to a better school without harm-
ing anyone if only the original priorities would be considered as binding (Erdil
and Ergin, 2008). However, removing the lotteries can cause strategic issues (Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu et al., 2009), so the lottery system remained in use. In Boston the
IA mechanism was replaced with the DA in 2005 (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005b).
This was a scientifically proposed redesign that led to much discussion in the lit-
erature since. Note that in recent years the Boston school choice system has been
transformed again, partly due to the request by the local authority to reduce bus-
ing costs (Shi, 2015). In the last decade at least a dozen US cities followed the
advice and used the assistance of the Institute for Innovation in Public School
Choice to establish a school choice system in the spirit of the successful New
York programme. Most programmes adopted the student-proposing DA, except
New Orleans, where the TTC algorithm was implemented in 2012 for the unified
public school admissions (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2017).
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European school choice. In Hungary a nationwide system has been in use
for secondary school allocation since 2000. The students apply to study pro-
grammes with no limit on the number of applications, and the schools set their
quotas for each study programme and rank their applicants strictly according
to exam results and interviews (so the selection is merit based). The student-
proposing DA is used to compute the solution, thus the classical Gale-Shapley
college admission model is followed (Biró, 2012). Similarly, a nationwide system
is used in Finland, where the schools rank their students separately based on
their grades and entrance scores. Every student can apply up to five schools and
the school-proposing DA is used for computing the solution (Salonen, 2014).
In Spain the admissions are organised separately in each municipality with
no common rules (Calsamiglia, 2014). According to Calsamiglia (2011) the IA
mechanism is applied everywhere with different priority systems. For elemen-
tary schools the location and sibling priorities are used (although in Madrid the
distance-based priorities were removed), whilst for secondary schools the priori-
ties are mostly coming from the grades of the students. In Barcelona there was a
change in the distance priority criterion in 2007, when the catchment area sys-
tem was replaced with a personal priority system where every child had priority
for at least the six closest schools. This change enabled the study of the strategic
aspects of the Boston mechanism (Calsamiglia and Güell, 2014). In Germany,
school admissions are organised separately in each of the 16 states. In Berlin
the IA mechanism is used with 10% of the seats reserved for low-income families
first, then 60% of the seats are allocated on the basis of merit (Basteck et al.,
2015), and the remaining 30% assigned by sibling priority and lottery.
The Amsterdam school choice programme was redesigned in 2015, replacing
a sequential version of the IA mechanism by the DA with multiple tie-breaking,
where no distance-based priorities are used (de Haan et al., 2015). Paris is
divided into four sub-districts and the students are required to seek schools
within their sub-district by getting 600 points in those schools. This number of
points can be obtained for academic performance, whilst 300 points are given to
low-income families, and 50 points are awarded for having siblings in the school.
A centralized platform called Affelnet is used in all districts with the school-
proposing DA, however, extra points are awarded in the first choice schools, so
the overall mechanism is actually closer to IA (Hiller and Tercieux, 2013). A
scientific paper on preference estimation based on data from one of the sub-
districts has been published recently (Fack et al., 2015).
Kindergarten allocation in Estonia. The kindergarten allocation in Esto-
nia is organised in cities usually based on a simple priority system with the
application date being the main criterion. This creates unfair and inefficient
solutions, since the preferences of the parents may change in the 3-4 years
between the birth and the admission, and social objectives are also neglected.
In 2015 Harku municipality agreed to redesign their mechanism on a sci-
entific basis, documented by Veski et al. (2017). We tested seven different
priority systems based on distance and sibling priorities combined with the
student-proposing DA. In the simulation we used the data submitted by the
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parents in 2016, which may be assumed to be truthful. We also conducted a
sensitivity analysis by adjusting the effect of the distance and sibling factors
on the parents’ preferences. The municipality decided to use a transitory pri-
ority system in 2016, where the importance of application date, age, distance
and siblings vary across the seats in a rotating manner.
Further Applications
There are many further centrally coordinated applications of two-sided matching
markets, some of which are of smaller size, and some others that are still in
preparation. Due to the lack of space we only mention some interesting examples
with future potential. In a coordinated project allocation university students are
assigned to supervisors or to their offered topics (Abraham et al., 2007; Manlove
and O’Malley, 2008). Adoptions could also be organised via more sophisticated
allocation mechanisms, as studied by Slaugh et al. (2016). Refugee allocation
under preferences is a timely issue discussed in some very recent mechanism
design papers (Delacrétaz et al., 2016; Andersson and Ehlers, 2016). Finally,
dating markets have always worked in a decentralised way, however due to
some novel platforms the search and selection may be better coordinated, e.g.
by signalling features (Lee and Niederle, 2015). We close this section with a
description on an internship project allocation experience.
Internship allocation at Corvinus University of Budapest. As part of a
Masters programme at Corvinus University the students are allocated to par-
ticipating companies to conduct internship projects in groups. In 2016 the
allocation mechanism was changed from IA to a stable matching mechanism
by requiring the 25 students to rank all of the 5 companies and asking the
companies to evaluate and score all of the candidates. The ties in the scores
gave us more flexibility to find a (weakly) stable matching that also satisfies
some distributional constraints, namely a lower quota on the number of stu-
dents at each company and also a balanced distribution of foreign students.
For the computation we used IP techniques (Ágoston et al., 2017).
18.3 Allocation of Indivisible Goods
Allocation of indivisible goods to strategic agents is a topic discussed in both the
matching literature under the name of two-sided markets with one-sided pref-
erences, and it also belongs to the field of fair division and resource allocation,




When every agent can get at most one single item, then the classical mechanism
is the serial dictatorship (SD), where the agents choose their objects one by one
according to some specified order, based e.g. on seniority. This mechanism is
used, e.g., for dormitory allocation in Israel (Perach et al., 2008). When the
agents are ordered randomly we call the mechanism random serial dictatorship
(RSD). RSD is strategy-proof and ex-post efficient, meaning that no set of agents
can improve their situation with an after-match exchange. However, this mech-
anism is not ex-ante efficient: the agents may exchange their marginal probabil-
ities and can sometimes improve their expected welfare. It is always possible to
obtain an ex-ante efficient probability distribution by the so-called Probabilistic
Serial (or eating) mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), however this
mechanism is manipulable.
In the resident allocation program of Israel RSD was used until 2014, but
in the redesigned mechanism they conduct improving exchanges to increase the
expected welfare of the residents, and in the meantime they randomise over as-
signments in such a way that every couple is guaranteed to get positions in the
same hospital, without harming the chances of the single doctors (Bronfman
et al., 2015b,a; Roth and Shorrer, 2015).
Online Matchings
In many situations the objects arrive one by one and have to be allocated im-
mediately. This is the case in deceased organ allocation, organised with a com-
mon protocol in eight European countries by Eurotransplant and also in Nordic
countries by Scandiatransplant. Social housing is another important applica-
tion, where the recipients may accept or reject offers in a strategic way (Leshno,
2015; Bloch and Cantala, 2017). Further interesting applications are the alloca-
tion of parking slots (Ayala et al., 2012) and airport landing slots (Schummer and
Abizada, 2017).
Course Allocation
How should we allocate the seats of the courses if some popular courses cannot
accommodate all the interested students? The simplest way is perhaps the serial
dictatorship (SD) mechanism, where students are ordered randomly and they
can choose their bundles one by one. This is happening in most of the Hungar-
ian universities, where the central administration website opens the enrollment
process and the students can take their turn whenever they manage to log into
the website. Perhaps it is more fair and less stressful to create a random order
by a transparent lottery and let the students select their courses at scheduled
intervals. The advantage of the SD mechanism is that it is Pareto-efficient and
strategy-proof, since each student selects the best bundle from the set of available
courses. However, the allocation is very unequal. One way to balance this over
the years of studies is to have adjusted lotteries favouring those who were less
fortunate so far. This is also the main intuition behind the draft mechanisms,
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used e.g. at the Harvard MBA courses (Budish and Cantillon, 2012), where the
students are randomly ordered and they can choose their courses one by one, by
switching the order of the picking sequence in the rounds. This results in more
egalitarian solutions, however the result is not Pareto-optimal, and the students
can benefit from strategic manipulations.
In bidding mechanisms, which are widely used in US colleges (Sönmez and
Ünver, 2010; Krishna and Ünver, 2008), the students have a virtual budget that
they can allocate over their targeted courses. The bids are ordered in a unique
ranking decreasing in price and they grant the bids one by one whenever pos-
sible. The biggest issue with this mechanism is that the students’ preferences
may not be aligned with their strategically optimal bids, since the most-preferred
course of a student may be less popular, so she could potentially get a seat there
also by a minor bid, but if she is lucky with her higher bids for most popular, but
personally least-preferred courses then she wont get her most-preferred course
due to credit limits. A proposed improvement is to collect the preferences of the
students together with her bids, which was also shown to be useful in experi-
ments (Krishna and Ünver, 2008).
Finally, another kind of improvement for the bidding mechanism is the us-
age of a competitive equilibrium solution of a combinatorial auction, with the
theoretical background prepared by Budish (2011), and implemented recently
at Wharton college (Budish et al., 2016). Here the students report their cardi-
nal utilities over the courses and the central coordinator computes the market
clearing prices. In this approximate equilibrium solution every student gets her
best possible bundle that is possible to buy from her budget under the mar-
ket clearing prices. Further advantage of this system is that students can also
express their valuations on sets of courses, making it possible to improve the
selection of the best bundle by stating which courses are substitutes and which
ones are complements of each other. However, it is challenging to elicit all the
relevant preferences in advance, so the direct revelation mechanisms may have
shortcomings when compared with sequential or decentralised mechanisms.
Priority mechanism at Eötvös Lóránd University (ELTE). Setting priorities
at each course and then finding a student-optimal stable solution based on
the students’ submitted linear preferences over the courses has been pro-
posed in the literature (Diebold et al., 2014). However, the course allocation
method used at ELTE is decentralised: the students can optimise their bun-
dles during a long enrollment period by seeing their possibilities at the ad-
ministration website. The priorities of the students are based on reasonable
factors, and multiple lotteries are used for breaking ties at every course sep-
arately. The students have to submit their ideal bundles in a preregistration
phase; the university can use these to adjust their quotas before the enroll-
ment starts, to better satisfy the demand. The only strategic issue might be
that the priority at a course also depends on whether the student included
that course in her submitted bundle at the preregistration. (This description
was based on the presentation by Ferenc Zaka and Tamás Solymos (ELTE) at
the 12th Workshop on Matching in Practice in December 2016, Budapest.)
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Further Applications
The assignment of papers to reviewers at conferences is coordinated in many
conference-administration websites, e.g. EasyChair, based on the reviewers’ pref-
erences, but the exact computational goals of these mechanisms are not known.
A couple of reasonable approaches were studied theoretically by Garg et al.
(2010). Foodbanks are responsible for allocation of unused food to people in need
in many countries worldwide. In the US the largest organisation, Feeding Amer-
ica redesigned its allocation mechanism in 2005 following the advice of a group
of economists. The new system is based on a combinatorial auction with virtual
credits (Prendergast, 2016), and significantly improved the efficiency and overall
welfare of the solution. Finally, a new approach was developed by Kurokawa et al.
(2015) for allocating sets of indivisible goods via a randomised mechanism, which
was successfully applied for room allocation to Charter schools in California.
18.4 Exchange Models
In exchange markets the agents are endowed with objects that they can exchange
to improve everyone’s situation without using monetary transfers. When every
agent owns exactly one object then the so-called housing market always has a
core solution, which can be obtained efficiently by Gale’s Top Trading Cycles al-
gorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). However, the core property (also called as
stability) may not be the only objective of the central organiser and constraints
may also apply, e.g. on the lengths of the exchange cycles, so different models and
solution concepts may be needed. Furthermore, when the agents own multiple
indivisible goods then the exchange problem becomes significantly more com-
plicated, even to decide the Pareto-efficiency of the solution can be challenging
under strong restrictions on the preference domain (Aziz et al., 2016).
Exchange of Indivisible Goods
The exchange of houses or rental flats, the original motivating context of Shapley
and Scarf (1974), has indeed been organised in ad-hoc exchange cycles without
monetary payments in many countries. A Czechoslovakian film, Ball lightning
from 1979 illustrates this, which also motivated a scientific paper on exchanges
with marrying and divorcing couples (Cechlárová et al., 2016). Timeshare ex-
changes (Wang and Krishna, 2006) are often organised in a coordinated way.
There are new platforms for exchanging homes for holiday, but typically allow-
ing only pairwise exchanges which are negotiated in a decentralised way. Finally
we shall note that a national exchange programme was established in 1943 for
exchanging shoes among those who needed only a half pair or who had feet of
significantly different sizes (Website of National Odd Shoe Exchange, 2016).
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Kidney Exchange
Kidney exchange is certainly the most important application of the exchange
model with indivisible goods, where patients with kidney failure wish to exchange
their incompatible donors for compatible ones. The first single-centre exchange
programme was established in South-Korea in 1991 and the Netherlands began
the first nationwide programme in 2004 (de Klerk et al., 2008). For an overview
we refer to two recent survey papers on this topic (Glorie et al., 2014; Ferrari
et al., 2015). The most important features of these centrally coordinated schemes
are that the lengths of the exchange cycles are bounded, e.g. in the Netherlands
(respectively UK) up to four (respectively three) patient-donor pairs can be in-
volved in an exchange cycle. The other distinguishing feature is that the goal of
the programmes are typically to save as many patients as possible, so the optimal
solution has maximum size under some constraints and priority criteria.
In the USA the New England Kidney Exchange Program was the first cen-
tralised scheme established in 2005 (Roth et al., 2005a). Currently the three
major nationwide programmes are organised by the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS), the National Kidney Registry (NKR) and the Alliance for Paired
Donation (APD) (Fumo et al., 2015). An important challenge in the US is that
the large transplant centres are very influential, and they conduct the majority
of the US kidney exchange transplants internally (e.g. the San Antonio centre).
They have a tendency not to report their easy-to-match patient-donor pairs to the
national schemes, but wait for suitable exchange partners within the hospital,
which results in the accumulation of hard-to-match pairs and highly sensitised
patients in the pool (Ashlagi and Roth, 2012). The usage of altruistic donors
to trigger so-called never ending chains became a common practice in the US
and it has improved the number of transplantations in the kidney exchange pool
significantly (Stepkowski et al., 2015).
The Dutch and the UK programmes were established in Europe in 2004 and
2007, respectively. In recent years new programmes have been developed in
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden. Moreover, there was already a transnational exchange between Aus-
tria and Czech Republic, and Sweden has also started to cooperate with Den-
mark and Norway via Scandiatransplant. In 2016 September a COST Action
was started (Website of COST Action: European Network for Collaboration on
Kidney Exchange Programmes, 2016) involving both practitioners and theoreti-
cal researchers in multiple disciplines, to study current practices, identify best
practices and key challenges, and investigate the possibilities of further transna-
tional collaborations. (A Handbook on the current practices is scheduled to be
published in July 2017.) Canada and Australia also have well established pro-
grammes — see the comparison by Ferrari et al. (2015).
UK paired donation scheme. The scheme has been run by NHS Blood and
Transplant since 2007 (Johnson et al., 2008) with matching runs conducted
every three months. At the beginning only two-way exchanges were allowed,
but since 2008 three-way exchanges have also been sought. The optimal so-
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lutions were first computed with an exact graph algorithm (Biro et al., 2009),
which was later replaced by a sequential IP solution (Manlove and O’Malley,
2014). Altruistic donors have been used to start chains involving one or two
patient-donor pairs from the exchange pool, with the last donor’s kidney given
to the waiting list. Overall, as if May 2017, from the 1676 patients registered,
1133 were identified for possible exchanges by the matching algorithm based
on the virtual cross-match tests, out of which 687 received organs in the end.
Exchange of Multiple Indivisible Goods
Swapping used books without monetary payments is an potential application
present in many countries (see e.g. ReadItSwapIt in the UK). The typical decen-
tralised exchange process of such a scheme is to offer the goods first to the
community for getting credits, and then spend the credits on other goods later
on. This organisation is also typical for timebanks (see e.g. TimebankingUK),
where the participants offer their time in the form of providing different services
(e.g. teaching math) and receive the same amount of time back in the form of
other services (e.g. French class or haircutting). There are many sites also for
exchanging babysitting services (e.g. BabysitterExchange).
A more serious application is the exchange of deceased organs among coun-
tries. Eurotransplant is an organisation involving eight European countries who
share their deceased donors among themselves in a fair way, and Scandiatrans-
plant is a similar organisation for Scandinavian countries. In their online alloca-
tion policy it is crucial to find the best suitable recipient(s) for the newly available
organs, but in the long run they also ensure the balancedness of the allocation,
that is, every participating country should receive about the same number of
organs as they offered.
The balancedness of the solution is also crucial in the tuition exchange pro-
grammes in the US, such as The Tuition Exchange, Inc, where member colleges
award the dependents of their staff with free tuitions that they can use at other
colleges. Thus essentially the colleges exchange their students. Although the
coordination of the exchanges is semi-centralised, the number of incoming and
outgoing students should be roughly equal for every college (Dur and Ünver,
2016). A similar framework is applied in the Erasmus programme, where Eu-
ropean higher education institutions exchange their students. These exchanges
are based on bilateral contracts, but in the long run every university cares about
the balance of the incoming and outgoing students, since every student pays the
tuition at her home university.
18.5 Further Matching Models
In this last section we mention some further models that have applications.
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Roommates Problem
The roommates problem was defined by Gale and Shapley (1962) as the exten-
sion of the marriage problem for non-bipartite graphs – this is also referred to as
a one-sided market in the economic literature. Here a stable matching may not
exist, but we can decide the existence in linear time. Regarding the correspond-
ing applications, finding roommates for twin rooms is a reasonable one, although
we are not aware of any recorded application of this sort. Note that the pairwise
exchange problem, i.e. where the length of exchange cycles is bounded by two,
is equivalent to the roommates problem, if stability of the solution is the main
concern. Therefore, for instance, the initial kidney exchange papers were also
concerned with matching problems on non-bipartite graphs, where the Edmonds
algorithm can find maximum size or maximum weight matching efficiently (Roth
et al., 2005b). A very recent application of the roommates model is speed net-
working at conferences (Vaggi et al., 2014), where the participants are scheduled
for one-to-one discussions on a scientific basis. Finally, we describe the classical
application of chess pairings below.
FIDE chess pairings. Chess pairings are used in both individual and team
tournaments for allocating the competitors into pairs based on their perfor-
mance. The most well-known pairing system is the Swiss system, invented
by Dr. Julius Müller of Brugg, which was first used in a chess tournament
at Zurich in 1895. The goal of a chess tournament is to determine the win-
ner and rank the others based on their results achieved in a fixed number of
rounds, typically nine. The common practice in all of the variants used by the
World Chess Federation (FIDE) is to try to match the players or teams with
those who are similarly ranked based on their performance so far. However,
the completeness of the pairing is also required (at most one player can be
unmatched, if the number of players is odd), and no two players can play
twice against each other. The colours are also important in individual tour-
nament, no player can play with the same colour three times in a row. The
main pairing rule used in the Swiss-tournaments has now four official vari-
ants, the Dutch, Lim, Dobov, and Burnstein systems (Website of the World
Chess Federation, 2016). The description of the pairing methods states that
every arbiter should be able to conduct the matching by hand, although of-
ficial pairing software applications are widely used. For the above reasons,
the descriptions of current processes contain some highly inefficient exhaus-
tive search procedures, as the arbiters cannot be expected to find a complete
matching, e.g., by using Edmonds’ algorithm. Yet, it is an interesting ques-
tion as to whether the solutions returned by the described processes can be
obtained by efficient algorithms, which can be implemented and used in a
software tool (Biró et al., 2017).
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Coalitional Matchings
Matching problems can be extended to so-called coalition formation problems,
where the groups of agents can agree on cooperations. An example that we have
already seen is the matching problem with couples, where a couple can form a
coalition with two hospitals. Stable 3D-matchings are also widely studied, where
the set of agents can be separated into three parties (rather than two, as in the
stable marriage problem), see e.g. (Biró and McDermid, 2010). In the group
activity selection problem the agents are assigned to activities and they may have
preferences also over the number of partners with which they participate in a
given activity, see Chapter 5 or this book. Finally, in some national grant agencies
(such as the Hungarian and the French ones) researchers can be involved in
multiple project proposals, but their contributions must be declared and no one
can be involved in projects with a total contribution exceeding 100%. These
applications can be described in a general game-theoretic framework, see e.g.
Biró and Fleiner (2016).
Matching with Contracts
In many applications two agents can choose from different contracts when co-
operating. For instance, as we have seen, in the Hungarian higher education
admission scheme the students may be admitted to the same programme under
two different contracts, mainly differing in the tuition fees. Cadet branch allo-
cation in the US is another important application, where the number of service
years may differ in optional contracts (Sönmez and Switzer, 2013). If multiple
contracts are possible in a many-to-one market, then the unit-capacity agents
should have the opportunity to order the contracts in their applications in any
way, as it is the practice in Hungary (but what is not allowed in the cadet branch
matching). With regard to the capacitated side, the preferences of the agents on
that side may be more complex over the sets of contracts, but as long as they
satisfy the so-called substitutability condition, stable solutions bound to exist
(Fleiner, 2003; Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005).
Matching with Payments (not covered)
In this survey we do not cover models where payments are allowed between
the agents, such as coordinated auctions, since this would probably double the
length of this chapter. However, we note that these applications are based on very
similar matching models, with common generalisations including the matching
with no payments models, see e.g. Kelso Jr and Crawford (1982). Indeed, some
important applications, such as the Google adwords auctions, can also be stud-
ied with such hybrid models (Aggarwal et al., 2009). Furthermore, there are also
examples for solving the allocation of indivisible goods with virtual auctions to in-
crease the overall efficiency and the fairness of the solution, as we have seen for
course allocation (Budish et al., 2016) and in the allocation process of foodbanks
(Prendergast, 2016).
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18.6 Conclusion
Discovering and describing the current applications based on matching mod-
els under preferences is an important task that our research community has
also recognised, e.g., in the European research network on Matching in Practice.
These findings can help us understand what the main features of the applica-
tions are and what the main questions, issues and challenges are. Scientists in
several disciplines can then join forces to analyse the performance of the current
mechanisms, and come up with ideas for possible improvements. Note though
that in many cases the optimisation criteria are not entirely clear, there may be
multiple solution methods to consider, and the best practices may highly depend
on the context. But our ultimate goal as scientists should be to help the decision
makers in the (re-)design of their applications to make them efficient, fair and
transparent, by serving the best interests of society.
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